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Ransomware security incidents have become one of the biggest threats to general
computer users who are oblivious to the ease of infection, severity, and cost of the
damage it causes. University networks and their students are susceptible to ransomware
security incidents. College students have vast technical skills and knowledge, however
they risk ransomware security incidents because of their lack of mitigating actions to the
threats and the belief that it would not happen to them. Interaction with peers may play a
part in college students’ perception of the threats and behavior to secure their computers.
Identifying what influences students’ threat avoidance behavior in the face of
ransomware security incidents is essential to managing students’ behaviors to protect
their personal and university computer systems. The goal of this research is to empirically
examine threat avoidance behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents
among college students. The research model extends the Technology Threat Avoidance
Theory with the addition of the factors of subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge
sharing, and experience of threat. The study focuses on the effects these factors have on
threat avoidance behavior. These factors determine if externalities such as social
pressures or previous experiences of threat influence avoidance behavior.
This study was a quantitative and empirical study using a non-probability design for
gathering data. The convenience sampling method was used to collect data using a survey
instrument. The items of the survey instrument were designed using the 7-point Likert
Scale. The data was collected from 174 United States college students using an online
survey tool. Prior to the main data collection effort, an expert panel review and a pilot
study were conducted. Pre-analysis data screening was conducted before analyzing the
data. Data analysis with survey data was conducted using Partial Least Square Structural
Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM) using SmartPLS 3.0.
The results of the study showed a positive and significant relationship between avoidance
motivation and threat avoidance behavior. Subjective norm was found to have a positive
effect on attitude towards knowledge sharing. However, the relationship between
subjective norm and response efficacy was not significant. The study contributes to the
body of knowledge by providing empirical evidence about the effect of factors of threat
avoidance behavior on ransomware security incidents among college students. It provides
insight into the experience and preparedness of students to deal with the threat of
ransomware.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Background / Introduction
According to Fimin (2017), in 2016 half of all the companies in the United States had
their systems infected by a type of ransomware with many of them paying the hackers an
average ransom of $2,500. The author also pointed to a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) study that calculated the total cost of these ransoms at $1 billion during 2016.
Yan et al. (2018) argue that students have unsafe computer behaviors; students tend to
trust most communications such as emails as long as they came from close friends. Yan
et al. (2018) also found that even students with computer security knowledge and skills
would choose to ignore good security practices.
Stanciu and Tinca (2016) demonstrated that students falsely believed they had above
average computer security knowledge. However, Scheponik et al. (2016) found that
students lack the skills and knowledge to protect their computers from security threats.
Students in the study felt comfortable with the level of safety provided by the most basic
of computer security solutions. For example, some students felt secure using encryption
alone and did not understand that good security requires multiple tools and methods. The
students also had difficulty understanding the difference between authentication and
authorization. According to Zhang-Kennedy et al. (2018), students from a university
affected by ransomware felt there was nothing they could do to protect themselves
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against such an attack and were indifferent towards increasing their cybersecurity skills
and knowledge.

Problem Statement
Ransomware has grown exponentially since Dr. Joseph Popp created and distributed
the first ransomware in 1989 (Nadir & Bakhshi, 2018). According to O'Gorman et al.
(2019), they detected nearly 545,000 ransomware attacks in 2018; 81% of which affected
enterprise users. Ransomware has become more sophisticated, harder to detect, and easier
to spread in a local network (O'Gorman et al., 2019). Sultan, Khalique, Alam, and
Tanweer (2018) state that from 2015 to 2016, the United States was the target of 28% of
all ransomware attacks and more than 50% of affected users were consumers. The
authors also mention that during 2016, the average affected user paid $1,000 to recover
their files.
Zhang-Kennedy et al. (2018) found that students of ransomware affected universities
were worried about cybersecurity shortly after the attack and some even began taking
concrete steps to have recent backups; a peak of 78% of students began making data
backups. However, as time passed, cybersecurity concerns decreased. In addition, 57% of
the students thought the university could have prevented the ransomware attack. These
same students decided to ignore cybersecurity education material because they felt there
was little they could do to protect their systems against ransomware.
This study examined the effect of the knowledge sharing attitude of college students
regarding the threat of ransomware security incidents. It is important to know if college
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students share security incident experiences with each other as this organic exchange of
knowledge may protect the group more efficiently.
The accumulation of firsthand knowledge, also known as experience, is of utmost
importance when facing a threat (Venkatesh, Brown, Maruping, & Bala, 2008).
Experience of threat is not necessarily a given; especially among risk prone students who
believe they are invincible (van Schaik et al., 2017). It is important to understand how the
experience of threat affects threat avoidance behavior.
Liang and Xue investigated the relationships around threat avoidance behavior. Liang
and Xue (2009) created the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT), while the
study of Liang and Xue (2010) validated the TTAT and tried to understand how it works.
Liang and Xue (2010)’s study was done with a small group of college students. The
authors also mention that the sources of threats and safeguards can be changed, while
also suggesting the effect of emotion in the model. The TTAT is a very flexible
framework. Liang and Xue (2010) state that it can be used to study several threats and
mitigating actions. They recommend that future research could be done with coping
based mitigating actions.
Ng and Rahim (2005) studied the home user’s intention to practice computer security.
Building their study on the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), one of the factors they
focused on was the subjective norm. Their study concluded that subjective norm did in
fact play a part in the user’s decision to practice computer security. Chi, Yeh, and Hung
(2012) studied the effect of subjective norm on a user’s perceived risk and usage
intention towards cloud computing services. They found that the influence of subjective
norm on usage intention is greater than the influence of perceived risk.
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Attitude toward knowledge sharing is important in a group facing a threat and is
derived from the attitude in the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). Zhang, Tsang, Yue, and Chau (2015)
argue there are similarities in how computer security experts and general topic online
learning communities share information amongst themselves. The authors observed that
those who are inexperienced remain as observers, while expert hackers share more
knowledge and advice with inexperienced hackers. Also, less experienced hackers tend to
ask questions and share more about their experience in search of guidance. The authors
conclude that even in the anarchical world of hackers, online communities have a
structure like any other merit-based learning community.
The volatile mix of modern ransomware and the apparent ignorance or indifference
from college students is dangerous to college networks (Zhang-Kennedy et al., 2018).
The study tests the relationship among the factors affecting threat avoidance behavior on
ransomware security incidents among college students. College students have vast
technical skills and knowledge. However, they risk ransomware security incidents
because of their lack of mitigating actions to the threats and the belief that it will not
happen to them. The peculiarities of young adults and their risk prone behavior pose a
risk to their personal systems and their university’s networks. We currently do not know
the factors influencing college students’ security behavior involving interaction with
peers. How college students’ threat avoidance behavior is influenced, and by which
factors, needs to be studied to understand how to mitigate the risks. Research into
Information Technology (IT) threat avoidance behavior has mostly focused on enterprise
and business users leaving a large gap in the general user population.
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Dissertation Goal
The research goal was to empirically examine a research model of threat avoidance
behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents among college students. The
model extended the TTAT by Liang and Xue (2010) with three additional factors subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and experience of threat - and
focused on the effect these factors have on IT threat avoidance behaviors in ransomware
security incidents.

Research Questions
1. How does subjective norm affect the attitude toward knowledge sharing among peers
following a ransomware security incident?
2. How does the experience of threat affect the perceived threat when a user discovers a
peer has been infected by ransomware?
3. How does attitude toward knowledge sharing affect perceived susceptibility threat
following a ransomware security incident?
4. How does subjective norm affect a user’s response efficacy following a ransomware
security incident?
5. How does perceived threat affect a user’s avoidance motivation following a
ransomware security incident?
6. How does coping appraisal affect a user’s avoidance motivation following a
ransomware security incident?
7. How does avoidance motivation affect a user’s threat avoidance behavior following a
ransomware security incident?
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Research Model
The research empirically examined a research model of threat avoidance behavior.
The research model shown in Figure 1, represents factors that influence threat avoidance
behavior and variables used to test the hypothesis.
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Figure 1. Research model of Threat Avoidance Behavior

Subjective norm has a positive effect on attitude toward knowledge sharing as the
greater subjective norms lead to greater sharing (Tu, Turel, Yuan, & Archer, 2015).
Bock, Zmud, Kim, and Lee (2005) also found that subjective norms had a positive effect
on the attitude toward knowledge sharing. There is also a positive attitude toward
information sharing if there is a subjective norm among the immediate social group,
which will encourage a greater exchange of information among the individuals
(Jarvenpaa & Staples, 2000). Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:
H1: Subjective Norm has a positive effect on Attitude toward Knowledge Sharing.
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The construct experience of threat is positively associated with perceived
susceptibility and perceived severity, since having experience with a threat increases the
user’s perception that the threat can happen again to a greater degree than the first time.
Individuals who go through a negative experience have a higher probability of being
hypervigilant to that vulnerability in future situations (Tu et al., 2015). Therefore, the
following hypothesis is developed:
H2: Experience of Threat has a positive effect on Perceived Severity.
H3: Experience of Threat has a positive effect on Perceived Susceptibility.
Attitude toward knowledge sharing is positively associated with perceived
susceptibility as more shared information about threats possibly increase the user’s
perceptions that something can happen (Bock et al., 2005). This construct captures how
willing an individual is to share their knowledge with others. Therefore, the following
hypothesis is developed:
H4: Attitude toward Knowledge Sharing has a positive effect on Perceived Susceptibility.
Social influence or pressure has been shown to affect the threat avoidance behavior of
information system users as people function most of the time as part of social units
(Liang & Xue, 2009). Humans are social animals, and their behavior would be constantly
affected by the actions and beliefs of other humans. The authors observed that most users
would eventually fall in line and conform to behaviors that are acceptable to the rest of
their social group. Social influences not only pressure users into behaving in one way or
another but also provide them with valuable information about what is acceptable by their
current group (Liang & Xue, 2009). This information may help the user predict the risks
of the possible IS threat and how viable the available mitigating actions or tools are.

8

Taylor and Todd (1995) argue that behavioral intentions are highly likely to be preceded
by subjective norms.
The construct subjective norm has a larger effect when the individual has little
experience and has yet to adopt a certain attitude (Chua, 1980). Subjective norm is a
determinant of intention and has an indirect but significant effect on behavior (Taylor &
Todd, 1995). Also, Tu et al. (2015) argue that social influences directly influence an
individual’s coping intentions. y increasing the individual’s threat perceptions,
subjective norms push them to find way to mitigate the perceived threat (Tu et al., 2015).
Chi et al. (2012) argue that subjective norm has a greater influence on individuals that
perceived risk. Individuals yield to society and group pressures to use a system even if
they perceive that system to be at risk. Individuals, for the most part, follow the observed
behavior of their immediate environment and group (Chan, Woon, & Kankanhalli, 2005).
ince sub ective norm affects an individual’s behavior, there should be a relationship
with how said individual reacts or behaves when facing the threat of ransomware.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:
H5: Subjective Norm has a positive effect on Response Efficacy.
As per the model by (Liang & Xue, 2010), the constructs of coping appraisal and
perceived threat have a positive association with avoidance motivation to threat
avoidance behavior. (Liang & Xue, 2010) empirically proved that individuals would be
motivated to avoid a threat if they have an elevated level of self-efficacy. Also, they
found that avoidance motivation has a significant influence on threat avoidance behavior.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is developed:
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H6: Perceived Severity has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.
H7: Perceived Susceptibility has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.
H8: Self-Efficacy has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.
H9: Response Efficacy has a positive effect on Avoidance Motivation.
H10: Avoidance Motivation has a positive effect on Threat Avoidance Behavior.

Relevance and Significance
The results of the research contribute to the body of knowledge by providing
empirical evidence about the effect of factors of threat avoidance behavior on
ransomware security incidents among college students.
Scheponik et al. (2016) argue that students are an important threat vector. The authors
point out that a significant number of college students, either by ignorance or overconfidence, do not have the technical knowledge to understand basic security topics. The
adage that students cannot see the forest for the trees holds true with students as they are
not able to see the big picture of the threat posed by ransomware. Most students feel
confident with only one threat mitigation solution (Scheponik et al., 2016).
Stanciu and Tinca (2016) stated that universities are concerned with the lack of risk
awareness shown by a significant number of students. Universities are becoming aware
of the security risks that companies face today and are interested in creating curriculums
and preparing future professionals that have basic security knowledge. The study by
(Stanciu & Tinca, 2016) also revealed that almost 3/4th of the students surveyed know of
a friend that has had a security breach. However, even with the knowledge that a friend or
a colleague had a breach, half of the students responded that they did not think their
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computers would be targeted by hackers. A large majority of these same students believe
that having an antivirus is not enough protection. However, that same group uses only an
antivirus for computer threat protection.
The study provides greater practical insight into how college students are reacting to
ever more common ransomware-based security threats. This new information helps
universities know where and how to better focus their risk awareness training. This effort
should trickle down the workforce into the industry as security-aware students become
professionals that understand the risks and have the right motivations to follow the
security policies in their workplaces.
Also, the TTAT is a flexible and reliable framework. However, there is not a lot of
scientific literature using the TTAT to study student threat avoidance behavior as most
studies tend to focus on company employees. Also, extending the TTAT with constructs
that focus on social connections and interactions adds the component of human
interconnectivity that has been modifying our behavior since the start of the social media
age. This hyper connected age we live in, where we are not just influenced by our nextdoor neighbor but by friends a world apart brings new variables that are interesting to
study. Before social media, college students would have known only of the ransomware
breach of their roommate but in today’s world, they will find out about dozens or
hundreds of breaches around their local campus or friends in other campuses of their
school system.
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Barriers and Issues
This study used a survey instrument as the main tool to gather the data. The use of a
survey instrument creates various risks. First, surveys depend on the participant’s honesty
and desire to share accurate personal information. Second, the questionnaires were
distributed through the Internet using Google Forms. This means participants answered
the survey by themselves without any assistance or opportunity to ask questions or
clarification of key terms. This research method required clear and precise questions that
had to be clearly understood by a pool of participants with diverse demographic
backgrounds. Since the survey was sent electronically, there is no assurance everyone
will fill out their survey. However, at the same time, using an online survey reduced the
possibility of errors when exporting the results to the analysis software.
McCormac et al. (2017) warned that depending on self-reporting may result in data
collection problems. The authors argued that due to the subjective nature of selfreporting, the data could have measurement errors. To mitigate data collection problems,
they recommended not asking participants their name or their employer’s name. They
argued that participants give more truthful answers if they are ensured anonymity and
confidentiality.

Assumptions
The study relies on a survey instrument to gather the data. It is assumed that the
participants followed an honor code and provided answers that were as truthful and
demonstrated the closest representation of their beliefs and experiences as possible within
the realm of the provided survey answer alternatives. It is also assumed that the
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participants had some knowledge or experience with information systems and had some
basic understanding of the computer and security related terms used in the survey items.

Limitations
As the study was only to be shared with college student listservers from schools
within the United States, this affects the generalization of the study regarding students
from other countries and outside the traditional college student age group. Also,
distributing the study via an online survey method may have affected the survey results.
Students who have more technical knowledge are more likely to be part of the listservers
that were used for the distribution and are more likely to answer an online survey.

Delimitations
Due to a large number of constructs and research questions in the model, the survey
turned out long and was a reason to contemplate giving participants a reward for
completing it. The survey questions were written in a clear and precise manner. The use
of a panel of experts and a pilot study helped to validate a survey that had a reasonable
length, with questions that were clear and precise, and provided the needed result data.
Shneiderman et al. (2017) argue that survey instruments should be pilot tested before
gathering the main research data. According to the authors, a pilot test is the best way to
make sure a survey instrument is providing unbiased and reliable results.
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Definition of Terms
Subjective Norm: According to Ng and Rahim (2005), it is what a person perceives as
the social pressures that influence him to perform a given action.
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing: Bock et al. (2005) define it as how inclined a
person is to share their knowledge with others.
Experience of Threat: Venkatesh et al. (2008) define it as an increased familiarity with
a negative behavior or action.
Perceived Susceptibility: Liang and Xue (2009) define it as how probable a user was to
be affected in a negative manner by an IS threat.
Perceived Severity: Liang and Xue (2009) define it as the perception of the user
concerning the severity of the results of the IS threat.
Self-Efficacy: Ng and Rahim (2005) define it as the confidence a user has in his or her
own ability to execute the threat mitigation processes.
Response Efficacy: Witte (1992) define it as how much an individual believes that a
threat mitigation action will be effective against a specific threat.
Avoidance Motivation: Liang and Xue (2010) define it as how motivated a user will be
to avoid an IT threat by performing or using the safeguarding measure or methods.
Threat Avoidance Behavior: Liang and Xue (2010) define it as a behavior or process
that keeps the user in a specific security state the farthest away from an end state with an
increased threat level.
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List of Acronyms
AVE: Averaged Variance Extracted
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation
IT: Information Technology
IS: Information Systems
PLS: Partial Least Squares
TPB: Theory of Planned Behavior
TTAT: Technology Threat Avoidance Theory

Summary
The focus of the chapter is presenting and arguing for the validity of the research
problem. It is argued that the examination factors influencing college students’ security
behavior involving interaction with peers should be studied. The problem necessitated the
goal of empirically examining a research model of threat avoidance behavior in the
context of ransomware security incidents among college students. This was studied by
extending the TTAT with the factors subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing,
and experience of threat. A series of research questions and hypotheses were developed
to test the extended model and its validity in answering the problem. Also, arguments
were presented supporting the significance of why the study should be done. Finally, the
barriers, limitations, assumptions, and delimitations were explained.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature

Theory
The model is derived from the work done mainly by Liang and Xue (2010) which is
built on Liang and Xue (2009). The research by Liang and Xue (2009) had the goal of
building a model to understand the Information System (IS) threat avoidance behaviors
exhibited by users of personal computers. From this study a model based on the TTAT
was developed and empirically validated. The authors observed that avoidance
motivation provides a satisfactory way to predict users’ I threat avoidance behavior.
They concluded that avoidance motivation was affected by the constructs perceived
threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, and self-efficacy. Liang and Xue (2010)
found that users only have threat perception if they think there is a real IS threat and that
the threat has credible and negative consequences on their system.
The TTAT has the benefit that it is a general framework that has been found to be an
effective way to explain the security related behaviors of IS users, even outside the
enterprise setting. The TTAT models how users perceive the existence of a threat and
what is the proper response to avoid it according to the available mitigation tools and
actions. The model showed that users could be motivated by a perceived threat if the
users are given insight on the magnitude of the damage the threat can cause and the
probability of it happening (Liang & Xue, 2009).
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In addition, two constructs are taken from the TPB: attitude toward knowledge
sharing and subjective norm. Attitude toward knowledge sharing is derived from the
attitude in the TPB (Ajzen, 1991). In comparison, the subjective norm is derived from the
work of Ng and Rahim (2005). Ajzen (1991) stated that attitude was a strong predictor of
a person’s intentions. According to their study, the personal aspect that attitude brings
helps it become an even stronger factor than the sub ective norm over a person’s
behavior. Ajzen (1991) argues that unlike other frameworks, the role of the TPB is to
explain why humans behave in a certain way.

Constructs
Subjective norm is a construct derived from the TPB. It is what people perceive as the
social pressures that influence them to perform or not to perform a given action (Ng &
Rahim, 2005). Subjective norms affect attitude toward knowledge sharing in a positive
manner (Bock et al., 2005; Tu et al., 2015). There is a greater chance of exchange of
information among individuals and thus a positive effect on the attitude toward
information sharing if there is a subjective norm among an immediate social group.
Chan et al. (2005) argue that on average, individuals observe behavioral signals of
others around them and imitate or follow that behavior. This herd behavior is amplified
when the observing individual has little experience (Chua, 1980). Taylor and Todd
(1995) called subjective norm a determinant behavior and argued that although it has an
indirect effect on behavior, the effect was significant, and it is likely that subjective
norms come before behavioral intentions.
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Liang and Xue (2009) observed that subjective norm pressure and influence people
but at the same time, it provides vital information that in prehistoric times could have
meant the difference between life or death for the human. When humans observe others,
they learn what behaviors, on average, would likely help them survive. Liang and Xue
(2009) stated that these social pressures affect threat avoidance behavior and may help IS
users predict the possible risks of any one of their actions and help them discern which
mitigating action might produce the best result. In agreement with this finding, Tu et al.
(2015) argued that an individual’s coping intentions would be directly affected by social
pressures. The authors also argue that when an individual’s threat perception increases,
the subjective norms act as a force that guides them to find a way to mitigate the
perceived threat. However, the subjective norm can have a negative effect on human
behavior. Chi et al. (2012) argued that subjective norms have a larger effect on a user’s
decision-making process than even perceived risk. Under enough pressure from their
social group, some users yield and accept the use of systems or methods that they
themselves perceived as risky.
In the TPB, attitude is defined as the general evaluation a person has of a given
behavior (Ajzen, 1991). This is remarkably like attitude towards knowledge sharing.
Attitude towards knowledge sharing has a positive association with perceived severity
and perceived susceptibility. According to Bock et al. (2005), as more information is
shared about a threat, there would be a probable increase in a user’s perception of that
threat’s certainty of happening.
Tu et al. (2015) argued that going through negative experiences can increase the
probability that a person becomes hypervigilant to that spectrum of threats in the future.
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Users that have undergone a negative experience in the information systems domain
would be more aware of the vulnerability in the future. When experience is gained,
uncertainty is reduced, and the person would have a better sense of control over that
behavior or action. Also, a person’s behaviors and actions become more intentional as
experience is gained (Venkatesh et al., 2008). Experience of threat has a positive
association with perceived susceptibility and perceived severity.
Liang and Xue (2009) described both perceived susceptibility and perceived severity
in their model. They defined perceived susceptibility as how probable a user was to be
affected in a negative manner by an IS threat. Perceived severity was defined as the
perception of the user concerning the severity of the results of the IS threat. Also, users
will begin searching for strategies to mitigate or cope with a potential threat as soon as
the user perceives the threat (Liang & Xue, 2009). Liang and Xue (2010) demonstrate
that the meta-constructs coping appraisal and perceived threat both have a positive effect
on avoidance motivation.
According to Ng and Rahim (2005), self-efficacy can be defined as the confidence a
user has in his or her own ability to execute the threat mitigation processes. While
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) define it as how much the user thinks he or she has the
required skill to execute recommended actions. Liang and Xue (2009) observed that if a
user had a higher level of self-efficacy in the required method of guarding against IS
threats, then the user would be more motivated to use the recommended method and
protect himself against the potential threat. Liang and Xue (2010) show that self-efficacy
has a positive effect on avoidance motivation.
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Witte (1992) defines response efficacy as how effective an individual believes that a
threat mitigation action is against a specific threat. he higher a person’s response
efficacy, the more probable it is that the person will use a recommended action to defend
against the perceived threat (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). This means that response
efficacy has a positive effect on avoidance motivation.
Liang and Xue (2010) define avoidance motivation as to how motivated a user avoids
an IT threat by performing or using the safeguarding measure or methods. While Chen
and Zahedi (2016), on the other hand, define avoidance as when users take actions such
as reducing their Internet use to avoid security threats.
Building on the cybernetic theory of Edwards (1992), threat avoidance behavior is
defined by Liang and Xue (2010) as behavior or process that keeps the user in a specific
security state the farthest away from an end state with an increased threat level. Their
study shows that avoidance behavior has a significant positive effect on threat avoidance
behavior. Threat avoidance behavior is also part of a group of behaviors also known as
adaptive coping. The behavior is described as one where the subject mitigates the threat
in an effective manner (Chenoweth, Gattiker, & Corral, 2019).

Ransomware Threat
Since the first ransomware attack in 1989, the threat has become more dangerous and
complex. During that first attack, the program would encrypt your files after the 90 th
computer reboot. It then went on to ask the user for a ransom of $189 and provided an
address in Panama to send the money. In the last three decades since that first attack,
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ransomware is more complex, easier to hide, and faster to distribute through a victim’s
computer networks (Nadir & Bakhshi, 2018).
Modern ransomware is not simply a single independent program that a victim
downloads and that infects their computer, home, or office network and computers.
Ransomware now depends on a complete infrastructure of VPNs, proxies, servers, and
webhosts that are willing to look away while their networks are used for criminal acts
(Richardson & North, 2017). According to Nadir and Bakhshi (2018), 57% of
ransomware victims are now home users. These users are threatened and blackmailed not
just with losing their encrypted data but also with the release of embarrassing photos or
documents that will be made public or sent to their close friends and families. This
change in targeting more individual users than enterprises, has to do with hacking groups
noticing that individual users are more likely to pay the ransom and not inform the
authorities. Individuals affected by ransomware pay an average of $300 for the key to
decrypt their data (Richardson & North, 2017). The authors also note that ransomware
hackers began using a dynamic pricing scheme that calculates ransoms according to the
victim’s country. This technique helps the hackers maximize the ransoms paid and has
allowed them to target poorer countries in the third world by asking for ransoms that are
within the economic reality of the target’s location.
Han, Hoe, Wing, and Brohi (2017) mention that the WannaCry ransomware infected
more than 200,000 computers in 150 countries. The authors note that in general, people
do not report infections. The scare tactics and threats of releasing personal information
keep many individual users from going to the authorities and reporting that they were
hacked, and their computer was encrypted. The authors also observed that most of the
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users were infected while accessing sites that promised free movie streaming, trying to
download through p2p services such as BitTorrent, or through phishing links.
The spread of modern ransomware is quick. Most of the newest and most aggressive
ransomware encrypts not just the initial computer where the file was downloaded but also
any other computer connected to the local network (Han et al., 2017). The authors
recommend that individual users should be made aware of the dangers posed by
ransomware and that best practices to protect themselves should be spread to social
media.

University Information System Vulnerability
The WannaCry ransomware affected 150 universities around the world (Mohurle &
Patil, 2017). University networks are especially vulnerable to computer security threats
like ransomware. The network topography, campus size, and diverse userbase make
university networks difficult to protect (Singh, Joshi, & Gaud, 2016). According to
Patyal, Sampalli, Ye, and Rahman (2017), the University of Calgary was hit with
ransomware once. Administration and faculty could not use their computers and students
were ordered not to connect to the school’s wireless Internet. The school paid the
attackers a ransom of $15,000. Even after having paid the ransom and receiving the
decryption keys, it took the University IT specialists ten days to repair the damage done
and bring up the school’s computer network and systems again.
Singh et al. (2016) warn that university computer networks have diverse attack
vectors that are hard to defend due to several factors. First, university networks are
mostly open networks with a large userbase. College campuses can be large and network
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security is even more complex when several geographically distant campuses are joined
under a wide area network configuration. Also, some large university departments want
to have their own locally managed decentralized internal network. This adds complexity
to a network that needs to provide access to students, administrative staff, and professors;
each with their own needs and permissions. In this environment, a ransomware infection
from a student’s personal computer infects a large part of the university’s network within
minutes.
Joshi and Singh (2017) argued that a university’s computer system environment has
different attack vectors than the networks of other large enterprises such as banks. They
also argue that the current security guidelines used by universities are not effective in
defending against modern threats such as ransomware.

College Student Information System Threat Behavior
Howarth (2014) argued that 95% of all computer security incidents are caused by
errors rooted in the human factor. Diaz, Sherman, and Joshi (2020) studied how college
students would respond to phishing attempts. In the phishing test, the authors found that
92% of the students opened the email and 59% of those who opened the email went on to
click the link. The authors then compared how the clicking rate varied across the different
schools and departments of the university. The Non-STEM students had higher click
rates than the STEM students. And within the STEM students, the Engineering and
Computer related majors had the lowest click rates.
Diaz et al. (2020) also observed older students clicked less on the phishing email than
the younger students. The authors did not find any difference in phishing avoidance
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among the genders. Finally, they concluded that student’s general lack of awareness of
phishing emails might be problematic for universities’ I security. Also, the authors
believe the students may have been overstating their knowledge as there was a
discrepancy in the phishing click rates and the security knowledge the students said they
had.
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Chapter 3
Methodology

Overview
A quantitative method is used for this study. The data was gathered using a survey
instrument which was developed by combining items from surveys that have been
empirically validated by previous studies. This new survey was used to gather the data
required to study the effects of the factors that influence the threat avoidance behavior in
ransomware security incidents among college students. The survey method allows for a
fast and efficient means of gathering information. Using electronic surveys provides
benefits similar to those of postal surveys, including the reduction of bias. Since, there
would not be an opportunity to explain the instructions or clarify definitions to the
volunteer in person, the questions must be straightforward (Holt, 1997).

Development of Survey Instrument
The survey used the 7-point Likert scale, as it could be more precise than other scales
(A. Joshi, Kale, Chandel, & Pal, 2015). They mention that 7-point scales give participants
more options and this means that people would be most likely to find the answer closest
to their individual perception of the situation in the questionnaire. The only exception is
the experience of threat construct, which is a binary item as per Tu et al. (2015).
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Table 1 outlines the 48 survey items developed to measure the degrees of the
constructs in the study. The construct name and an abbreviation for each item are given.
Also, the descriptions are the actual item statements that were answered by the
participants. Lastly, Table 1 includes the citation of the source from where the survey
item is taken and the construct’s composite reliability, which measures the internal
consistency.
Table 1
Survey Items Descriptions and Sources
Construct Name

Description

Subjective Norm
SN1

My university IT Dept thinks that I should
share my anti-ransomware knowledge with
other students.

SN2

My professors think that I should share my
anti-ransomware knowledge with other
students.

SN3

My friends think I should share my antiransomware knowledge with other students.

SN4

Generally speaking, I try to follow the
University’s I security policy and intention.

SN5

Generally speaking, I accept and carry out my
friends security ideas and suggestions even
though they are different from mine.

SN6

Generally speaking, I respect and put into
practice my friends’ security practices.

Attitude Toward Knowledge Sharing
ATTK
S1

My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with
other students is good.

ATTK
S2

My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with
other students is an enjoyable experience.

Survey Item
Reference
(Bock et al.,
2005)

Composite
Reliability

(Bock et al.,
2005)

0.9184

0.8230
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ATTK
S3

My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with
other students is valuable to me.

ATTK
S4

My anti-ransomware knowledge sharing with
other students is a wise move.

Experience of Threat
EOT1

(Tu et al.,
2015)

‘ inary’

(Liang & Xue,
2010)

0.957

(Johnston &
Warkentin,
2010)

0.897

(Liang & Xue,
2010)

0.945

Have you had a ransomware infection in the
past?

Self-Efficacy
I could successfully install and use antiransomware software if …
SE1

… there was no one around to tell me what to
do

SE2

I had never used a software like it before

SE3

I had only the software manuals for reference

SE4

I had seen someone else doing it before trying
it myself

SE5

I could call someone for help if I got stuck

SE6

.. someone else helped me get started

SE7

I had a lot of time to complete the job

SE8

I had just the built-in help guide for assistance

SE9

.. someone showed me how to do it first

SE10

I had used similar software like this one
before to do the job

Response Efficacy
RE1

Anti-ransomware software works for
protection

RE2

Anti-ransomware software is effective for
protection

RE3

When using anti-ransomware software, a
computer is more likely to be protected

Perceived Severity
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PS1

Ransomware would delete my personal
information from my computer without my
knowledge

PS2

Ransomware would invade my privacy

PS3

My personal information collected by
ransomware could be misused by cyber
criminals

PS4

Ransomware could record my Internet
activities and send them to unknown parties

PS5

My personal information collected by
ransomware could be subject to unauthorized
secondary use

PS6

Ransomware would slow down my Internet
connection

PS7

Ransomware would make my computer run
more slowly

PS8

Ransomware would cause a system crash on
my computer from time to time

PS9

Ransomware would affect some of my
computer programs and make them difficult
to use

Perceived Susceptibility
PSU1

It is extremely likely that my computer will be
infected by ransomware in the future.

PSU2

My chances of getting ransomware are great.

PSU3

There is a good possibility that my computer
will have ransomware.

PSU4

I feel ransomware will infect my computer in
the future.

PSU5

It is extremely likely that ransomware will
infect my computer.

Avoidance Motivation

AM1
AM2

I intend to use anti-ransomware software to
avoid ransomware
I predict I would use anti-ransomware
software to avoid ransomware

(Liang & Xue,
2010)

0.972

(Liang & Xue,
2010)
(Chen &
Zahedi, 2016)

0.977
0.94

28
AM3

I plan to use anti-ransomware software to
avoid ransomware

AM4

I intend to periodically use anti-ransomware
software to protect my computer from
ransomware.

AM5

In the immediate future I intend to customize
my browser and computer settings to prevent
the intrusion of ransomware on my computer.

AM6

In the near future, I intend to check my
computer for the presence of ransomware.

Threat Avoidance Behavior

TAB1
TAB2

(Liang & Xue,
2010)
(Yoon, Hwang,
& Kim, 2012)

0.920
0.75

I run anti-ransomware software regularly to
remove ransomware from my computer.
I update my anti-ransomware software
regularly.

TAB3

I immediately delete suspicious emails
without reading them.

TAB4

Under no circumstance would I ever open a
USB drive without running a ransomware
scan.

Survey Instrument Validation
Once the preliminary survey was developed, the next step was to bring together 4-6
subject matter experts to be part of the expert review panel. The panel’s main task was to
validate each survey item’s relevance to the definitions of the constructs (Sireci &
Faulkner-Bond, 2014). Based on the feedback from the panel, the final wording and
structure were modified. After recommendations by the panel, the next step was to pilot
test the survey with 20-25 college students. The goal of the pilot study was to evaluate
the survey for clarity, ease, and to have an estimate of how much time it took to
complete. The results of this pilot test were also empirically analyzed to validate the
survey and make sure the correct data was gathered. According to Shneiderman et al.
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(2017), survey instruments should be pilot tested before gathering the main research data.
The authors argued that a pilot test is the best way to confirm a survey instrument is
providing unbiased and reliable results.

Data Collection
The target group from which data was collected are individual students from United
States universities. The study used a non-probability sampling design, specifically
judgment sampling which is an extension of the convenience sampling method. This
method is preferred since data is being gathered from college students (Sekaran &
Bougie, 2016). Students were invited to participate voluntarily in the study by sending
invitations with the survey link to public email listservers. One example of these
listservers is the Hispanic in Computing group through which invitations to participate in
studies, scholarships, and workshops are constantly shared with hundreds of students
from universities across the nation. Sending messages through these groups does not
require special permissions from the owners and at no moment is personally identifiable
information required as messages are sent to a specific general account that then forwards
the messages to the group members. The available listservers had a reach of more than
1,500 students from United States universities.
In the study by Trespalacios and Perkins (2016), students responded to the online
invitation on average of 23% to 26%. The authors found no significant difference in
participation rates between invitations that were personalized or not. Also, Johnston and
Warkentin (2010) were able to achieve a 40% response rate without giving any
incentives. In their study, 73% of the respondents were in the 18-29 demographic. The
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computer focused email listservers that were targeted are made up of highly engaged
students that continuously participate in group topics.
Ringle, Sarstedt, and Straub (2012) argue that to have reliable results when using PLSSEM, it is important to have an acceptable level of measurement. Although many
researchers using PLS-SEM use the rule of ten or five to determine the sample size, this
calculation should only be used as a rough guideline and should be verified with more
precise power analysis software or by using Cohen (1992) power tables (Hair, Ringle, &
Sarstedt, 2011). Although PLS-SEM has demonstrated usefulness with small sample
sizes, Kante, Chepken, and Oboko (2018) argue that depending on complexity, studies
using PLS-SEM should have a sample size of at least 200 participants.
To have an estimate of the sample size, the rule of ten could be used. According to
Hair Jr, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2016), the largest number of formative indicators
measuring a construct would be multiplied by 10. Construct Self-Efficacy has ten
indicators, resulting in 100 when multiplied by 10. However, to have a precise estimate
of sample size, the G*Power Version 3 software was used (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). Using an effect size of 0.25, an error probability of 0.05, and a power of
0.95, G*Power calculates a sample size of 164 participants. This number is also near the
number of participants studied in Liang and Xue (2010), 152. Based on all the
considerations, the safer sample size for this study was 164.
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Data Analysis Plan
The goal was to analyze the data gathered from surveys completed by college
students for measurement validation and hypothesis testing. The data analysis follows the
tests and methods used by Liang and Xue (2010) with PLS-SEM.
Once the data collection phase was complete, the data underwent a pre-analysis data
screening. During this phase, the collected data were checked for missing data, suspicious
patterns, outliers, and data distribution. Concerning data distribution, Hair Jr et al. (2016)
point out that although PLS-SEM does not require normally distributed data, it should
still be checked in case the data is extremely non-normally distributed. Once the data is
ready for analysis, SmartPLS3 was used for the main analysis. According to the
recommendation of Fornell and Bookstein (1982), Partial Least Squares (PLS) is chosen
as an analysis method because it was found to be more robust when testing complex
structural models. This method is also useful for the prediction of the impact independent
variables have on the dependent variable. PLS also has the benefit that a valid analysis
can be done with smaller sample sizes. In the study by Ringle et al. (2012), 36% of the
researchers surveyed said they preferred to use PLS because it allowed them to run tests
in small sample sizes.

Testing Measurement Model
The goal of the measurement model is to test the relationship between the latent
variables and the observed data. The validation of the measurement model was performed
by following the steps taken by Liang and Xue (2010) to determine the convergent and
discriminant validity of the constructs. According to Hair Jr et al. (2016), convergent
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validity tests whether constructs that are expected to be related really are related.
Discriminant validity tests whether constructs that are expected to be unrelated really are
unrelated. The testing criteria for the convergent construct validity Liang and Xue (2010)
used was that items should have a higher weight load per item on the hypothesized
construct when compared to other constructs. While for the discriminant validity test;
building on the recommendation by Fornell and Bookstein (1982); the criteria used was
that the square root of the construct’s averaged variance e tracted (AVE) has to be larger
than the correlations with the other constructs being tested. A PLS confirmatory analysis
was done to calculate the item loadings and the constructs AVE were calculated. Also,
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated to measure the internal consistency of the items and if
the result is over 0.70 then the model has the necessary measurement reliability (Hair Jr
et al., 2016). Finally, model fitness was determined using the SmartPLS standardized root
mean square residual method. The method output reveals differences between observed
and expected model correlations. The model would be considered a good fit if the values
are between 0.08 and 0.10.

Testing Structural Model
The study verified how subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, the
experience of threat, perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, self-efficacy, and
response efficacy affect each other. The study used the following as control variables;
age, gender, and internet experience. The goal of the structural model test was to analyze
the relationship between the latent variables. These relationships connect the input and
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output of the model. The arrows connecting the constructs represent the structural
hypothesis of the model.
To determine how constructs affected one another, this study calculated the beta
coefficients. The beta coefficients of the PLS structural model are also known as the
standardized regression coefficients. These values are calculated by performing SEMPLS analysis on standardized values. This process allowed the analysis of the effect of
independent variables on the dependent variable even if the data has values in different
measurement units (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). The R2, path coefficients, and significance
of the coefficients of the structural relationships were calculated. In PLS-SEM for the
path coefficient to be significant in a two tailed t-test, the t-value > 1.95. This value gave
us a p<0.05. These p-values of a structural path can be calculated in SmartPLS through
the process of bootstrapping (Hair Jr et al., 2016). Bootstrapping is a resampling
technique that tests the coefficients’ significance.

Resources
A survey instrument was used to gather the required data. The survey was created
using the Google Forms application that is part of the Google Docs suite of Office
Applications. The Google Docs suite of Office Applications is a free web-based
application. Once the data was gathered, SmartPLS3 and SPSS were used to analyze the
data. All the required resources were obtainable when required.
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Chapter 4
Results

Pilot Study Expert Panel
During September and October of 2020, a group of four volunteers with academic
and professional experience in information system security accepted the invitation to be
my Expert Panel and evaluate the survey instrument.
The volunteers were provided with a copy of the dissertation abstract, the survey, and
a rubric with which to evaluate the survey. he title of the rubric is “ urvey/Interview
Validation ubric for

pert anel” (V

). It was created by

arilyn . immon and

Jaquelyn White (White & Simon, 2011). The goal of the rubric is to include criteria that
measure face validity, construct validity, and content validity. The rubric uses a 4-point
scale ranging from a 1 (Not Acceptable – major modifications needed) to a 4 (Exceeds
Expectations – no modifications needed). The criteria measured are as follows: clarity,
wordiness, negative wording, overlapping responses, balance, use of jargon,
appropriateness of responses listed, use of technical language, application to praxis,
relationship to the problem, and survey adequately measures each construct. These
metrics were answered for each individual construct evaluated. The rubric has a total of
19 criteria.
The experts evaluated the survey measurement items, and we then discussed their
thoughts and recommendations about the survey items. Most of the experts scored the
majority of the criteria with a 4. A score of 3 was mainly given to negative wording,

35

overlapping responses, clarity, and wordiness. None of the criteria scored in the twos or
ones or required their recommendations with respect to the validity of the actual
questions and constructs. The main recommendations focused on making changes to the
format of the survey, dividing it into pages instead of one long page, and changing words
in several questions to improve the clarity/readability. One of the experts asked about the
similarities of two sets of questions and the possibility of removing one of each.
However, after discussing the goal of the questions and the testing of answer validity, the
expert did not recommend the removal. To improve clarity and readability, I divided the
survey into more sections to limit the number of items per page. Also, periods were
added at the end of each item statement. The experts also recommended the addition of
two demographic questions: 1) Are you enrolled in a computing related major? 2) Are
you aware of your University’s I security policies?
The four experts are bilingual and have complete fluency in the English language.
However, they are non-native English speakers. This allowed them to give me additional
feedback regarding the clarity of the items that a native speaker would not have provided.
For example, one of the panelists mentioned that the double negative in items AM4 to
AM6 was difficult to understand and forced her to reread them several times in order to
understand them. Therefore, it was decided to eliminate these three items and to also
delete ATKS2. In addition, items TAB3 – TAB6 were moved to Avoidance Motivation.
As three items from Threat Avoidance Behavior were moved to Avoidance Motivate,
only two items were left to measure Threat Avoidance Behavior. This required adding
two new items to Threat Avoidance Behavior to have four items measuring the construct.
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The data from the rubric was added to SPSS and reliability statistics analyses were
run. SPSS ran the reliability statistics on 10 of 19 metrics as the other 9 had zero
variance. he test calculated a Cronbach’s Alpha based on the standardized items of
0.708 which means there is an acceptable internal consistency.

Pilot Study Analysis Results
Between the months of November and December 2020 a pilot study was completed to
determine flaws in the planned methods and to observe possible response rates. At the
end of the established pilot study, there were a total of 16 participants in the survey.
Every single one of the participants filled out all questions. There was no missing data in
the result file.
The number of participants was lower than expected. The invitations were sent to
various email listservs that are known to have high participation rates. It is suspected that
in situations relating to the Covid-19 pandemic and the highly unusual university
semesters that were and are currently in session, students might not have been as
motivated as usual to complete a survey at the end of their semester. The mitigation plan
was to send the survey to additional listservs along with reminders.
The pilot study data was added to SPSS. The results of the Descriptive Statistics, the
Cronbach’s Alpha, and the bar charts with the demographics are shown in Appendix D.
To test for construct reliability, the Cronbach Alpha of each set of items making up the
constructs was also calculated. Avoidance motivation resulted in a coefficient of 0.968,
Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing had a coefficient of 0.819, Perceived Severity had
a coefficient of 0.937, Perceived Susceptibility of 0.932, Response Efficacy of 0.906,
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Self- Efficacy of 0.746, Subjective Norm of 0.789, and Threat Avoidance Behavior of
0.725. Since Experience of Threat has only one item, its coefficient is 1.00. Because all
the Cronbach Alpha values are greater than 0.7, all of the constructs have internal
consistencies that are acceptable.

Main Study Analysis Results
The data for the main study analysis was gathered during the month of March 2021.
According to the calculation done using G*Power, the recommended minimum number
of participants was 164. Data were gathered from a total of 174 participants. As seen
during the pilot test data gathering period, getting the required number of participants was
no easy task. The combination of hybrid or purely online learning due to the pandemic
and the different Spring Break Holiday periods throughout United States universities
during the month of March was a large obstacle to the data-gathering effort. As anecdotal
reports have observed, students did not seem as motivated as they have been in the past to
participate in online surveys, although this topic is for a different study that is outside of
the scope and the domain of the present dissertation. To mitigate the low participation
rate seen in the pilot study, the invitations were sent to more email distribution listservs
and an increased number of reminders were sent to invite students to participate in the
study.
The data from the main study was added to SPSS for cleanup and pre-analysis tasks.
The results of the Descriptive tatistics, the Cronbach’s Alpha, normality, Mahalabonis
distance and outlier test, and additional charts were added to Appendix E. Table 2 has a
summary of the demographic data.
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Table 2
Demographic Data (N=174)
Data Items

Frequency

Valid Percent

Cumulative Percent

18-25

97

55.7

55.7

26-35

50

28.7

84.5

36-45

13

7.5

92.0

46-55

12

6.9

98.9

56-65

1

0.6

99.4

Over 65

1

0.6

100

Male

53

30.6

30.6

Female

115

66.5

97.1

Prefer not to say

6

2.9

100

Age

Sex (N = 173)

How many years have you been using the internet?
5 years or less

4

2.3

2.3

6-10 years

37

21.3

23.6

11-15 years

59

33.9

57.5

Over 15 years

74

42.5

100

Are you enrolled in a computing-related major?
Yes

52

29.9

29.9

No

122

70.1

100

Are you aware of your University’s IT Security Policies?
Yes

84

48.3

48.3

No

90

51.7

100

The age distribution of the survey participants was the following: 97 students out of
174 were between 18 and 25 years old, 50 were between 26 and 35 years old, 13 were
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between 36 and 45 years old, 12 were between 46 and 55, one student was between 5665, and one was over 65. The sex distribution of the participants was as follows: 53
students were male, 115 were female, five preferred not to say, and one participant did
not provide an answer and left it blank. It should be clarified that this was the only
instance of a blank value in the data set.
Concerning the question about their years of internet experience, participants
answered the following: 74 participants said they had over 15 years of internet
experience, 59 said they had 11-15 years of experience, 37 said they had 6-10 years of
experience, and four said they had five years or less of internet experience. On the
question asking if the students were aware of their university’s IT security policies, 90
answered no and 84 answered yes. Finally, on the question that asked if they were
enrolled in a computing related major, 122 students said no and 52 said yes.
As expected, most of the volunteers were traditional college age students in the 18-25
years old range. However, surprisingly, a substantially larger number of female students
answered the survey than male students. This could be in part due to the composition of
the listservs where the survey participation invitations were sent to. Also, a majority of
students said that they were aware of their universities’ IT security policies. At the same
time, most of the participants were not from a computer related major. This last detail is
important because it means that the survey was answered by a more technically diverse
population than having only computer savvy computer majors answer the survey and
provides more generalizable answers.
To test for outlier cases, the Mahalanobis distance was calculated using the linear
regression analysis in SPSS. No case with outlier data was found in the dataset.
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To test for item internal consistency, Cronbach’s Alpha is calculated using SPSS. All
variables except for Experience of Threat were tested as this variable is Boolean. All
variables except for Threat Avoidance Behavior were above the threshold of 0.700 to
satisfy the reliability test. However, Cronbach’s Alpha for hreat Avoidance ehavior
was 0.692 which is close to the 0.700 thresholds. he data for Cronbach’s Alpha can be
observed in Table 3.
Table 3
Cronbach’s Alpha
Variable

Number of Items

Cronbach’s Alpha

Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing

4

0.876

Subjective Norm

6

0.784

Response Efficacy

3

0.895

Self-Efficacy

10

0.842

Perceived Severity

9

0.923

Perceived Susceptibility

5

0.884

Avoidance Motivation

6

0.928

Threat Avoidance Behavior

4

0.692

The main data analysis was done using SmartPLS. The goal of the first part of the
analysis with SmartPLS is to test the measurement model. More information on
bootstrapping can be found in Chapter ’s section on esting tructural

odels. In these

analyses, bootstrapping was performed to assess the path coefficients’ significance by
resampling the collected data. SmartPLS is configured to do 2,000 subsamples during the
bootstrapping procedure and then subsequently performed factor analysis. Once the
calculation is complete, outer loadings verify the estimates calculated for the
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relationships of the survey measurement items to corresponding constructs in the model.
The result tells us how much an item contributes to the construct to which it has been
assigned. This process is iterative and is run several times until only items that have outer
loading values over 0.7 remain. Each model construct was further dissected into survey
statement items and each of these items was tested independently within the model
construct. All survey statement items were identified to be significantly different from
null expectations. The loadings reported in Table 4 are the regression coefficients to the
scores upon which the t-statistics are calculated. Loading values of about 0.7 are
considered to explain more than 50% of the indicator’s variance. Any items that were
identified as having a loading value below 0.7 were excluded from further analyses. The
calculated p-values were used to accept or reject the null hypotheses with respect to the
measurement model test. It was observed that the t-statistic values were consistent across
model constructs except for four self-efficacy items and two of the perceived severity
Items. However, the variance in these two constructs did not change the associated pvalues.
Table 4
Measurement Model Testing Results
Construct

Item

Loading

t-statistics

p-values

Subjective Norm

SN1

0.877

27.941

< 0.001

SN2

0.922

42.955

< 0.001

SN3

0.887

54.820

< 0.001

ATTKS1

0.827

23.982

< 0.001

ATTKS2

0.867

29.630

< 0.001

ATTKS3

0.894

40.830

< 0.001

ATTKS4

0.828

21.705

< 0.001

Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing
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Self-Efficacy

Response Efficacy

Perceived Severity

Perceived Susceptibility

Avoidance Motivation

Threat Avoidance Behavior

Experience of Threat

SE3

0.710

3.313

< 0.001

SE4

0.820

4.478

< 0.001

SE8

0.858

4.512

< 0.001

SE10

0.720

3.345

< 0.001

RE1

0.917

46.347

< 0.001

RE2

0.921

54.331

< 0.001

RE3

0.888

31.146

< 0.001

PS4

0.727

6.858

< 0.001

PS5

0.702

6.553

< 0.001

PS6

0.886

20.783

< 0.001

PS7

0.900

17.763

< 0.001

PS8

0.919

18.529

< 0.001

PS9

0.870

15.421

< 0.001

PSU1

0.715

12.207

< 0.001

PSU2

0.834

20.773

< 0.001

PSU3

0.849

28.751

< 0.001

PSU4

0.871

26.063

< 0.001

PSU5

0.867

30.698

< 0.001

AM1

0.893

46.163

< 0.001

AM2

0.859

32.238

< 0.001

AM3

0.902

43.404

< 0.001

AM4

0.865

23.508

< 0.001

AM5

0.833

30.854

< 0.001

AM6

0.796

25.489

< 0.001

TAB1

0.929

64.923

< 0.001

TAB2

0.910

38.421

< 0.001

EOT1

1

0

1
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Before the PLS test is run to test the structural model, the discriminant validity should
be verified using the Fornell-Larcker Criterion. As shown by the results in Table 5 all are
within the correct ranges and demonstrate that no two constructs are correlating and are
measuring correctly different concepts correctly.
Table 5
Discriminant Validity
ATTK AM

EOT

PS

PSU

RE

SE

TTK

0.854

AM

0.262

0.859

EOT

-0.186

-0.176 1

PS

-0.012

0.015

-0.227 0.838

PSU

0.2

0.318

-0.191 0.045 0.83

RE

0.163

0.338

-0.019 0.08

SE

0.018

0.156

-0.002 0.117 -0.201 0.216 0.779

SN

0.518

0.102

-0.05

TAB 0.148

0.648

-0.122 0.058 0.316

0.064

0.056 0.125

SN

TAB

0.909
0.093 0.141 0.896
0.171 0.011 0.084 0.9191

Table 6 shows the composite reliability calculated through SmartPLS. All of the
composite reliabilities are within the acceptable parameters of greater than 0.700.
Table 6
Composite Reliability
Relationship

Composite Reliability

Threat Avoidance Behavior

0.916

Subjective Norm

0.924

Self-Efficacy

0.860

Response Efficacy

0.934

Perceived Susceptibility

0.917
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Perceived Severity

0.934

Experience of Threat

1

Avoidance Motivation

0.944

Attitude Towards Knowledge Sharing

0.915

Since the measurement model is satisfied for PLS-SEM analysis, the structural model
was used to test the hypotheses. Figure 2 shows the PLS-SEM model with the appropriate
R-squared values. The 42% variance of threat avoidance behavior is explained by the
constructs in the research model. Table 7 shows the path coefficients for the model. In
this table I can evaluate the p-values for the different relationships in the model. The
model shows that the relationship between subjective norm and response efficacy is not
significant. Equally significant relationships are found between perceived susceptibility
and avoidance motivation and response-efficacy and avoidance motivation.
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H1 is supported as subjective norm has a positive effect on attitude towards
knowledge sharing (β

0.518, p < .001). H2 is not supported as experience of threat did

not have a positive effect on perceived severity (β

-0.227, p < .001). The coefficient is

negative, indicating the relationship is negative. H3 is not supported as experience of
Threat had a negative effect on perceived susceptibility, because the coefficient is
negative (β

-0.159, p = 0.062). H4 is supported as attitude towards knowledge sharing

had a positive, although small, effect on perceived susceptibility (β

0.0.17, p = .05). H5

is not supported as the positive effect of subjective norm on response efficacy was found
to be minimal and of no significance (β

0.093, p = 0.211). H6 is not supported as a

negative effect measured between perceived severity and avoidance motivation was not
of significance (β

-0.043, p = 0.542). H7 is supported as there is a positive and

significant effect of perceived susceptibility on avoidance motivation (β

0.336, p <

.001). H8 is not supported as there is a positive effect by self-efficacy on avoidance
motivation and the level of significance nears the significant threshold (β

0.167, p =

0.059). H9 is supported as response efficacy was found to have a positive effect on
avoidance motivation (β

0.284, p < .001). H10 is supported as avoidance motivation

was found to have a positive effect on threat avoidance behavior (β

0.648, p < .001).

Table 7
Structural Model Testing Results

Hypothesis Path
H1
H2

Subjective Norm →
Attitude Towards
Knowledge Sharing
Experience Of Threat→
Perceived Severity

Coefficient

tstatistics

pvalues

H
Supported?

0.518

8.967

< 0.001

Supported

-0.227

3.813

< 0.001

Not
Supported
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H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10

Experience Of Threat→
Perceived Susceptibility
Attitude Towards
Knowledge Sharing→
Perceived Susceptibility
Subjective Norm→
Response Efficacy
Perceived Severity→
Avoidance Motivation
Perceived Susceptibility→
Avoidance Motivation
Self-Efficacy→ Avoidance
Motivation
Response Efficacy →
Avoidance Motivation
Avoidance Motivation →
Threat Avoidance Behavior

-0.159

1.865

0.062

Not
Supported

0.17

1.961

0.050

Supported

0.093

1.252

0.211

-0.043

0.061

0.542

0.336

4.689

< 0.001

Supported

0.167

1.893

0.059

Not
Supported

0.284

4.368

< 0.001

Supported

0.648

13.098

< 0.001

Supported

Not
Supported
Not
Supported
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary

Conclusions
The goal of this dissertation research was to empirically examine threat avoidance
behavior in the context of ransomware security incidents among college students. This
was done by extending the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory with the addition of the
factors subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and experience of threat.
These factors were chosen to determine whether social pressures and previous
experiences of threat can influence avoidance behavior.
Data for this study was gathered from 174 participants in United States colleges
during March of 2021. During the testing of the measurement model using SmartPLS, it
was observed that various constructs had items with outer loadings that were under the
0.7 threshold (Hair Jr et al., 2016). These items were removed, and the analysis was run
again. This procedure improved the model analysis.
The research also had seven research questions. Concerning the first question,
subjective norm was observed to have a positive effect on attitude towards knowledge
sharing. People with higher levels of subjective norm would be more likely to share their
knowledge about ransomware infections with friends. In the second question, experience
of threat had negative effects on both constructs that make up perceived threat; perceived
severity and perceived susceptibility. Experience of threat was expected to have a
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positive effect on perceived threat, however it did not. This unexpected result deserves
further study in the future. The third question concerns the effect of attitude towards
knowledge sharing on perceived threat. The results revealed that a positive but small
effect on perceived susceptibility. In the fourth question, subjective norm was observed to
have no significant effect on response efficacy. The fifth question concerns the effect of
perceived threat on avoidance motivation. Perceived threat is made up of perceived
severity and perceived susceptibility. The research showed that only one of the
constructs, perceived susceptibility, had a positive effect on avoidance motivation; while
perceived severity had a minimal negative effect that is not significant. The sixth question
is about the effect of coping appraisal on avoidance motivation. Coping appraisal is made
up of the constructs self-efficacy and response efficacy. The research showed that only
one of the constructs had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. However, the effect
of response efficacy was significant, while the effect of self-efficacy was small and of no
significance. The last question is about how avoidance motivation affects threat
avoidance behavior. The research showed that avoidance motivation had a strongly
significant effect on threat avoidance behavior.
Of the 10 hypotheses, five of them were not supported by the results: H2, H3, H5,
H6, and H8. H2 stated that experience of threat would have a positive effect on perceived
severity while H3 stated that experience of threat would have a positive effect on
perceived susceptibility. However, the observed effect was the opposite. H2 and H3 were
based on (Tu et al., 2015). This study argued that individuals that underwent through
some kind of threat would then become hypervigilant about that threat in case it appeared
again in the future. It is of particular interest, that in the study, experience of threat was
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positively associated with both constructs that make up perceived threat. However, in my
research, the opposite relationship was observed; experience of threat had a negative
effect on both constructs that make up perceived threat. This demonstrates that there
might be a problem with the items used to measure the constructs that produced an
unexpected result.
H5 stated that subjective norm would have a positive effect on response efficacy.
Again, the effect observed in this relationship was the opposite. Tu et al. (2015) argued
that social influences directly influence an individual’s coping intentions. Chi et al.
(2012) observed that subjective norm would have a greater effect on individuals who
perceived risk. However the contradiction with my findings could be related to what was
observed by Chua (1980). That study found that subjective norm does influence
individual behaviors, but the author found a very particular caveat. The effect would be
observed mostly in individuals who had little experience and had yet to adopt a particular
attitude or mindset. This is an important detail because 42% of the survey participants
said that they had over 15 years of internet experience. This large amount of experience
could have affected the relationship between subjective norm and response efficacy since
people with more experience are less affected by subjective norm.
H6 stated that Perceived Severity would have a positive effect on avoidance
motivation. However, the opposite was observed. Liang and Xue (2010) observed that
perceived threat had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. perceived threat is
composed of the constructs perceived severity and perceived susceptibility. In this study,
only perceived severity had a negative effect while perceived susceptibility had a positive
effect on avoidance motivation.
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H8 stated that self-efficacy would have a positive effect on avoidance motivation. In
this study, the effect of self-efficacy was small and not significant. Liang and Xue (2010)
observed that coping appraisal had a positive effect on avoidance motivation. Coping
appraisal is composed of the constructs self-efficacy and response efficacy. In this study,
self-efficacy had a small effect on avoidance motivation that was not of significance,
while response efficacy had a larger and significant positive effect.
Although avoidance motivation had the expected effect as seen in previous research
that validated the model used, it is interesting to observe that perceived threat and coping
appraisal did not produce results as expected. Previous research stated that both
constructs would have a positive effect on avoidance motivation, but this was not the
result. Only one of the two constructs that make up each one was found to have a
significant and positive effect on avoidance motivation.
Also, the constructs that were added to the Liang and Xue (2010) had mixed results.
subjective norm was not found to have a strong or significant effect on response efficacy.
This could be caused by the fact that 42% of survey participants were experienced and
the more experience a person is, the less they are affected by subjective norm (Chua,
1980). However, subjective norm did behave as expected with a strong positive effect on
attitude toward knowledge sharing. This last construct had a significant but weak positive
effect on perceived susceptibility. The biggest outlier was experience of threat. It was
expected that this construct would have a strong and significant effect on perceived
threat, but the opposite was observed.
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Implications and Recommendations
Ransomware is becoming an increasing threat to information system users. At the
same time, college students have been largely ignorant of their relative risk for becoming
victims of ransomware infections. This study expanded the TTAT to better understand
the perceptions and behaviors of college students towards ransomware threats by using
three additional features: subjective norm, attitude toward knowledge sharing, and
experience of threat. The TTAT explains how individual IT users engage in threat
avoidance behaviors. The study validated the effect of avoidance motivation on threat
avoidance behavior as seen in previous TTAT literature. Also, response efficacy and
perceived susceptibility was found to have the expected effects on avoidance motivation.
However, perceived severity and self-efficacy did not behave as expected. While
Experience of threat had a significant and negative effect on perceived severity, selfefficacy was not affected by any of the extending features. The unexpected results in
some of the constructs should be studied further to determine why the behavior was so
different in comparison to the literature.
The study showed that attitude towards knowledge sharing increased perceived
susceptibility, which then leads to avoidance motivation. This suggests that even in
students with high levels of inherent knowledge about threat avoidance, perceived
susceptibility was sufficient to have a positive effect in threat avoidance behavior. In
addition, this study found that several of the proposed hypotheses were supported.
Subjective norm was observed to have a positive effect on attitude towards knowledge
sharing. One explanation for this is that the participants had a high understanding of
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threat avoidance behaviors, although this could have biased the expectations that they
might be more significantly influenced by subjective norms.
This study provides clear information on how college students understand the risk of
ransomware to their computer systems, how they obtain knowledge about risk, identify
threats within their surroundings, and how they avoid those risks.

Limitations and Future Studies
The scope of this research was limited to the study of threat avoidance behavior of
United States college students in the context of ransomware infections. Inviting only
students from the United States affects the generalization. First, other countries have
different threat levels of ransomware infection; be it because of less computer security
knowledge or different availability of software tools to protect the systems. Also,
different countries may have various levels of threat avoidance behavior as there are
different levels of risk behaviors among societies.
Another limitation of the study was the data collection method. The data was
collected as a web-based survey. Web based surveys have several biases such as selfselection, desirability, and acquiescence bias. And lastly, a limitation that cannot be
ignored is the time frame during which the data was gathered. Starting in the year 2020,
the world has been operating under the stress and preoccupation of the Covid-19
pandemic. The pandemic forced governments to order shutdowns including the closure of
on-site college education in most of the world. This has changed how students work and
learn. It can be surmised that the constant presence of Covid-19 on students’ minds may
affect, first; the desire of students to spend time completing an online web survey. And
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second it may have affected the answers of those who volunteered and completed the
survey. It is possible that some of the answers would have been different during a less
stressful time for the survey volunteers.

Summary
The main objective of this research was to examine threat avoidance behavior in the
context of ransomware security incidents among college students by way of extending an
existing framework, the Technology Threat Avoidance Theory. The introduction of the
study provided background and foundation for the domain and the research problem that
the study focuses on. Hypotheses were developed based on the research question and a
research model was proposed. Barriers and limitations which the research could face
were also discussed and possible mitigations were presented.
This research extends the TTAT with the constructs subjective norm, attitude toward
knowledge sharing, and experience of threat. Based on previous studies, the research
investigated what effect these factors have on threat avoidance behavior. These factors
determine if externalities such as social pressures or previous experiences of threat
influence avoidance behavior. The literature review compiles the constructs of the
proposed model, gaps in the body of knowledge, and contributions from previous studies.
The Methodology Chapter compiles the research design. It was determined that a
quantitative and empirical study using a non-probability design was the best approach for
this research. The survey item was designed using the 7-point Likert Scale and the
convenience sampling method was used to collect data. This chapter also discusses the
design of the survey instrument, its validity and reliability, and the data collection
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strategy. The survey instrument was given to a panel of experts to review for clarity,
application, and validation that the items measured the constructs adequately. After
approval by the panel of experts, a pilot study was conducted to perform item reliability
tests, determine flaws in the data collection method, and observe the possible participant
response rates. Data analysis was then completed with the use of SmartPLS 3.0 and
SPSS. These statistical and modeling tools were used to test for factor analysis, construct
reliability and validity, measurement model, and structural model. The results and
analyses of these tests were presented in Chapter 4 and the Appendices. The analysis of
the statistical results was then used to reject or support the hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents
the study conclusions, the implications and recommendations, limitations, and possible
future research.
The study brought into focus a particular sector of user that is not usually studied,
college students. The results provide a better understanding of college students’ threat
avoidance behavior in the face of ransomware infections. It also concluded with
unexpected results. Some of the hypotheses were not supported as was expected based on
previous literature. Future studies should focus on why the results of previous studies in
other population demographics and sectors were so different when applied in the context
of college students. Also, the results provided insight into the technical experience
students have, their knowledge of university IT security policies, and differences among
computing and non-computing students. The results of the study shed light on an
important population that is not studied enough in the context of ransomware attacks and
how they respond or act to prevent the infections. It is interesting that some results were
opposite to what is seen in studies done in the corporate environment. Also, it cannot be
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ignored that the stresses affecting students since March 2020 due to the Covid-19
pandemic may have affected their answers. More studies should be made to better
understand how subjective norm affects a lesser experienced population and its
relationship with attitude toward knowledge sharing after the pandemic is under control
and students go back to the normal daily circumstances. Finally, further study is
necessary to determine why the experience of threat did not have the expected strong
effect on perceived threat and if this may have to do with the impulsivity and risk taking
tendencies of the demographic under question.
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Appendix C
Pilot Study Expert Panel Reliability Statistics
Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's
Alpha

Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items

.707

N of Items

.708

10

Inter-Item Correlation Matrix
Negative_Wordi
ng

Overlapping_R
esponses

Appropriatenes
s_of_Reponses
_Listed

Clarity

Wordiness

Clarity

1.000

1.000

-.577

-.577

-.333

Wordiness

1.000

1.000

-.577

-.577

-.333

Negative_Wording

-.577

-.577

1.000

.000

.577

Overlapping_Responses

-.577

-.577

.000

1.000

.577

Appropriateness_of_Repon
ses_Listed

-.333

-.333

.577

.577

1.000

Measure_of_Construct_ET

-.333

-.333

.577

.577

1.000

Measure_of_Construct_PS
U

-.333

-.333

.577

.577

1.000

Measure_of_Construct_PS

-.333

-.333

.577

.577

1.000

Measure_of_Construct_RE

-.333

-.333

-.577

.577

-.333

Measure_of_Construct_TA
B

-.333

-.333

.577

.577

1.000
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.577

-.577
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.577

.577
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U
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1.000

1.000

-.333

Measure_of_Construct_RE

-.333

-.333

-.333

1.000

Measure_of_Construct_TA
B

1.000

1.000

1.000

-.333
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Appendix D
Pilot Study Descriptive and Reliability Statistics

Age
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Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's
Alpha
.880

Cronbach's
Alpha Based on
Standardized
Items
.870

N of Items
49
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